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Globalization is affecting our lives in ways that we never
expected before. Greater interdependence, some scholars argue,
weakens the ability of nation-states to retain their authority
over individuals and corporations. However, nation-states are
highly adaptable and they have the power to maintain their
primacy
.
Governments have the ability to choose which model of
development their economies should pursue. Thus, based on the
choice of economic model, nation-states shape their economies
and the way business operates within it. In other words,
governments will essentially steer their economies in a certain
direction, even though they cannot determine the exact path that
the nation's economy will follow. In this thesis, I study how
the Brazilian government is coping with the emerging challenges
imposed by globalization through a neoliberal reform program
while maintaining the state's authority.
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CHANGING NATURE:
THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN GLOBALIZATION AND
ECONOMIC REFORMS IN BRAZIL
By Lucas Gimenes Loureiro
As trade across borders increases, communication costs
plummet, and governments around the world become more
interconnected, many pundits do not hesitate to declare that the
world is entering a new phase. However, contrary to what we may
have initially thought, the new phase that they foresee will
hold darker prospects for the future. Instead of leading to
prosperity and peace, some argue that globalization has weakened
the nation-state. 1 In turn, weaker nation-states will not be
able to promote order and protect citizens and may even
collapse. Hobbes' "state of nature" may dominate the
international and domestic security sphere as well as the
economic field. Feeble states will not be able to maintain
their monopoly over violence; private individuals and
organizations may take over this function from the state. This
may lead to a lawless situation. Moreover, nation- states , as
1 Reich, Robert. The Work of Nations: Preparing Ourselves for the 21 st Century,
New York, NY: First Vintage Books, 1992.
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they are outweighed by corporations, will lose their ability to
regulate the market. Given this scenario, some pundits expect
the world to be incorporated by big businesses. 2 Such a future
seems chaotic -almost apocalyptic -as many proclaim the coming
of anarchy, the return of the Middle Ages, the clash of
civilization, "earthquakelike events [...] threatening the
stability of all great powers," and even the end of history. 3
Will reality look this grim for nation-states, including
Brazil? The environment in which nation-states operate is
changing rapidly. Non-government actors increasingly compete
for what once was the exclusive power of the states. However,
the collapse of nation-states will depend on the actions of the
states themselves, as they have the ability to shape their
economies as to strengthen the state and to maintain sovereignty
over their affairs as international interconnectedness expands.
Because states can effectively manage the conditions listed
above to their benefit, we can expect that nation-states will
maintain their leadership role in both domestic and
international affairs in the future to come. Although the
leadership in core areas will be maintained, states will need to
2 According to the World Bank, the combined sales revenues of the world's 200
largest corporations already surpass the combined GDP of all nations with the
exception of the ten largest economies. Moreover, the sales revenues of such
corporations are equivalent to 27.5% of the world's total economic output.
3 See Kaplan (1994), Rapley (2006), Huntington (1993), Gaddis (1999), and
Fukuyama (1989) .
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get used to sharing their powers with other actors in peripheral
areas
.
In the initial sections of my thesis, I will define the
types of powers nation-states can attain and present a
discussion on the nature of those powers. I will enumerate and
define the different types of power that are commonly employed
by the states. In addition, I will demonstrate that the ultimate
source of power, "hard power", rests with the state. Although,
private citizens and organization have gained "soft power" , the
state is the only institution in our society that can utilize
both hard and soft power to achieve its objectives. States have
the necessary type of power to maintain their authority over
individuals and corporations. Moreover, I will argue that
despite the growing interconnectedness and interdependence,
globalization still lacks the necessary strength to affect
negatively the ability of the state to exercise its powers.
Furthermore, I will demonstrate that the state has the ability
to shape the economy by choosing from different models of
development. Thus, the power of business can be quickly
curtailed if the state deems it to be one of its
responsibilities. The case of neoliberal economic reforms in
Brazil will be used to illustrate this point.
Until early 1990s, Brazil lagged behind the other Latin
American countries in terms of economic liberalization. Chile,
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under a strict military regime, introduced economic reforms as
early as the 1970s; furthermore, these policy reforms were
expanded under the auspices of a democratic government.
Argentina, Mexico and many other countries in the region
followed Chile's example during the 1980s and the beginning of
the 1990s, though reforms in those countries were not as broad
or successful as in Chile. 4 Notwithstanding a late start, once
it became clear that Brazilian society could no longer bear the
cost of an unstable economy, elites in Brazil, especially
politicians, the bureaucracy and businesspersons , realized the
need to introduce neoliberal market reforms. Since then,
changes that promoted macroeconomic stabilization were swift.
Unfortunately, the process of furthering reforms has faced
obstacles and has slowed down after the inflationary crisis was
contained and the economy stabilized.
Brazil's economy under military rule was marked by a strong
dirigisme; from 1964 to 1985, the Brazilian government attempted
to manage the economy through central planning, increased
regulations, and arbitrary controls such as prices and wages
freeze. Furthermore, the military, with its focus on attaining
economic self-sufficiency, began to utilize Import Substitution
Industrialization (ISI) programs as one of its primary economic
Teichman, Judith A. The Politics of Freeing Markets in Latin America: Chile,
Argentina and Mexico. Chapel Hill, NC : The University of North Carolina
Press, 2001.
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policy choices. 5 The goal of ISI policies was to shell Brazilian
industries from international competition by raisin trade
barriers. Soon after the military stepped down from the position
of power and Brazil returned to democracy, liberal economic
reforms became a top priority in the political agenda. However,
the first attempts to reform failed. Heterodox approaches,
congressional opposition and political instability prevented the
successes of these pioneering plans. In 1993 and 1994, as
society could no longer bear the weight of hyperinflation and
sluggish economic growth, Fernando Henrique Cardoso, then
Finance Minister under President Itamar Franco, devised and
implemented the Piano Real. 6 Following the successful
stabilization of the economy, Cardoso, who was elected President
of Brazil for two consecutive terms (1995-1998 and 1999-2002)
,
achieved some mixed results in the implementation deeper
structural reforms. Doubt about the future of economic reforms
in Brazil grew as Cardoso's presidential terms ended and voters
favored the opposition candidate. Nevertheless, Luiz Inacio
Lula da Silva, despite his criticism of the economic policies of
' Font, Mauricio A. Transforming Brazil: A Reform Era in Perspective . Oxford,
U.K.: Rowman & Littlef ield Publishers, 2003.
The Piano Real was an economic package aimed at stabilizing the Brazilian
economy and combating overwhelming inflation, which according to the
Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatistica (IBGE) averaged 764% per year
during the beginning of the 1990s. The majority of the measures introduced by
the Piano Real followed the policy prescriptions of the Washington Consensus,




the previous government, quickly set stabilization, fiscal
adjustment, and tax and pension systems reforms as priorities of
his administration.
While discussing economic reforms in Brazil, I will focus
on the period from the return to civilian rule and the tenure of
Jose Sarney toward the end of Fernando Henrique Cardoso's second
term in the Presidency. This section of the thesis will include
an overview of the Brazilian economic history starting in 1929
until 1985. Additionally, this review will be followed by an
assessment of the initial attempts to liberalize the economy
that took place during 1985 and early 1990s. A minimum
knowledge of Brazilian economic history will prove to be
necessary in order to understand the conditions that led to the
reform push of the early 1990s. Such conditions, including the
elite's dissatisfaction with the State and with the previous
nationalist model of development, the economic crisis that
resulted from successive fiscal and trade deficits, and the oil
shocks or 1973 and 1979, generated enough momentum for the
endorsement of liberalizing policies during the initial years of
the democratic regime.
Moreover, the author will analyze the implementation of the
Real Plan, which was very successful in bringing inflation under
control and stabilizing the economy. Furthermore, the different
phases of the Real Plan, starting with economic stabilization
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and proceeding through the adjustment process of the Federal
Government public finances, including the maintenance of a
primary budgetary surplus, will be scrutinized. To evaluate the
success and shortcomings of neoliberal economic reforms in
Brazil, the author will discuss the conditions conducive to
reforms. To conclude this work, the political sustainability
and the future of economic reforms in Brazil will be discussed.
Can we expect the already implemented reforms to stay or will
politicians overturn most of the liberal policies as has happen
in Venezuela? 7 Will the push towards liberalization continue in
the coming years or is there is no more political capital left
for this trend to continue?
The Locus of Power
Thus far, we have explored what nation- states can do to
maintain their authority both abroad as well as domestically.
However, we still need to explore how states can achieve their
goals. What are the sources of state's power? Individuals and
organizations, including states, need the ability to obtain
favorable outcomes as well as material resources that can be
used in pursuing their goals. Keohane and Nye divide this
ability into behavioral power (skills) and resource power
Since the election of Hugo Chavez in 1998, Venezuela has experienced a
reverse in course towards a state- led development model.
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(resources) respectively. 8 Furthermore, they subdivide
behavioral power into hard and soft power. Hard power, as
defined by Keohane and Nye, is the ability to persuade others to
do what you would like them to do. States can coerce other
parties by using physical force or the threat of or they can
offer incentives in order to achieve their objectives.
Conversely, soft power is the ability to convince others that
your goals are the same as what the other parties want; it is
based on persuasion. Nation-states and private parties need to
use behavioral power to achieve their goals; however, the source
of power varies depending on who the actor is.
The growing power of corporations and civil society does
not necessarily threaten the authority of the nation-state,
because the origin of state's power is different from the origin
of corporations' or civil society's power. In the Western
political tradition, the state has the monopoly over the use of
force. Because it represents the society as a whole, the state
is the only institution that can use the threat of violence
(coercion) or even violence in a legitimate manner to convince
others to follow similar goals to its own. Furthermore, besides
the utilization of hard power, the state can also apply soft
power to its pursuit of the public interest. Non-state actors
! Keohane, Robert and Nye, Joseph. "Power and Interdependence in the




cannot make legitimate use of hard power. Corporations, civil
societies and individuals are restricted to use soft power.
Despite being limited to the use of only one type of power
soft power - corporations have seen their ability to influence
others grow exponentially.
Vivien Schmidt argues that privatization and deregulation
lead to decreasing controls over capital. 9 The deregulating
process took place because of the increasing ability of
corporations to convince others that deregulation is beneficial
for the whole system. Nonetheless, the state still can use its
hard power to force corporations that operate, within their
borders, to do so in manners that the state deems necessary and
beneficial for the public good. The state can also persuade
society that a specific approach to the economy, namely one in
which corporations have too much freedom, is not conducive to
the public good. Therefore, by using its soft power, the
government can influence and convince society that an approach
that enables government participation in detriment of
corporation involvement in the economy is needed.
Interconnectedness vs. Interdependence
In recent years, the term "globalization" or the practice
' Schmidt, Vivien A. "The New World Order, Incorporated: The Rise of Business
and the Decline of the Nation State," Daedalus, Vol. 124, no. 2 (Spring
1995) .
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of transforming the word "global" into a prefix to a variety of
other words (i.e. global finance, global security, global
markets, etc.) has been used and abused by many, especially
journalists, business people and politicians. Many of those
"globaphiles" see humanity entering in a unique, new era;
however, globalization and interdependence have a smaller impact
in world politics than what the majority of its supporters have
thought. People overstate the impact of globalization because
their evaluation is most often based on the increasing frequency
of contacts and interactions across national boundaries.
Evidence supporting greater interconnectedness is readily
available. Alex Inkeles stated that the world's
interconnectedness is increasing at unprecedented speeds; as he
wrote, "recent decades reveal a general tendency for many forms
of human interconnectedness across national boundaries to be
doubling every ten years". 10 However, it is important to notice
that interconnectedness, as Keohane and Nye put, "is not the
same as interdependence". 11 Sure, the world is becoming
increasingly interconnected, but is it becoming truly "global" 12 ?
' Inkeles, Alex. "The Emerging Social Structure of the World." World
Politics, 27 (July 1975) .
1 Keohane, Robert and Nye, Joseph. Power and Interdependence. New York, N.Y.
Longman, 2 001
.
In this context, global means that states are becoming mutually dependent.
Actions taken by one state not only influence others countries but also have
to be approved by all interdependent nations. Moreover, the consequences
affecting one state will affect the others.
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The concepts of globalization and interdependence as they
are broadly applied to any interaction across border do not
elucidate the state of affairs of contemporary world politics.
In fact, these terms offer us, at best, a superficial view about
the impact of international interconnectedness in the twenty-
first century. The current usage is misleading for several
reasons. First, during the twentieth century, the world went
through periods of globalization and fragmentation. Second, the
idea that we are living in a time as never before tends to twist
reality. Globalization is a process in constant evolution; it
draws from previous societal developments. Moreover, the idea
of globalization and interdependence is used by many as a mere
rhetorical device. Lastly, states have the possibility to
choose the form and intensity they participate in "global
relations." Thus, globalization does not reduce states'
sovereignty, but it influences how they behave in the
international and, to a lesser degree, in the domestic arena.
Some "globalists" think that the process of globalization
will only intensify its influence as time passes. Nevertheless,
there are other forces in international politics that tend to
balance the powers of globalization. Fragmentation is one of
those forces. Moreover, the relationship between those two
processes is more complex than just simple opposition. As Ian
Clark stated, "globalization and fragmentation are themselves
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too closely interrelated" as there is an ongoing interaction
between those two processes. 13 In Globalization and
Fragmentation, Clark gave several examples where circumstances,
which seemed to foster fragmentation but resulted in the
promotion of globalization and vice versa. Furthermore, a
specific period of history may also allow those two forces two
operate. For example, the inter-war period (1919-1938)
experienced two distinct phases in which each of those forces
were distinctly predominant. Globalization of trade faces the
growing influence of regional trading blocks; countries may
engage in regionalism in an attempt to shelter themselves from
globalization.
There is no doubt that the process of globalization has
accelerated in the last decades. However, it is following a
continuum of previous developments. Even though some people
have argued that we are entering a period of deep changes in our
means of production, governance, and culture, those changes have
not undermined the core assumptions of those structures. 14
Instead of weakening capitalism and transforming us into a post-
capitalist society, globalization reinforces the basic
assumption of this system - free accumulation of profits even
5 Clark, Ian. Globalization and Fragmentation : International Relations in the
Twentieth Century. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997.
14 Scholte, Jan. Globalization: A Critical Introduction. London: Palgrave,
2000 .
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when this occurs across borders. The production mode of western
society is still based on the same liberal principles of free
initiative and accumulation of capital. Cheaper and easier ways
to communicate across borders facilitate the ability to control
transnational corporations and to deliver products to consumers
around the world, but the objectives of capitalists of today's
world remain the same as those of one hundred years ago.
Globalization may also enable the modernization of society, but
this progress is grounded into previous development. In this
sense, it relates more to an evolutionary process with its sense
of continuous changes rather than a revolution with rapid and
sometimes violent changes.
Trade, capital movement and immigration have not increased
dramatically in the last century. As Ngaire Woods demonstrated,
levels of international trade as a proportion of GDP were very
similar in 1913 as in 1993. 15 This led many to question what is
new about the globalization process in the twentieth century
since the level of interaction among countries has been similar
for almost eight decades. Some scholars, such as Keohane and
Nye, have argued many people have used the concept of
globalization as a rhetorical tool in order to advance their
3 Woods, Ngaire (Ed.). The Political Economy of Globalization. London
Palgrave. 2000.
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private interests. 16 Many examples of globalization as a
rhetorical device can be found in the behavior of Brazilian
politicians. From the Military dictatorship to the current Lula
administration, politicians have manipulated the notion of
interdependence in order to achieve their policy goals. For
example, the military junta asserted that increased trade
liberalization and interconnectedness would threaten Brazilian
sovereignty while Lula points the "negative aspects of
globalization" to justify he social programs put forward by his
administration, such as Fome Zero (Zero Hunger) . 17
Certain political scientists have stated that globalization
may lead to the reduction of states' sovereignty. In their view
the growth of cross-border relations puts in check the ability
of the state to regulate its citizens. However, as Scholte has
argued the states control their participation in global
relations. 1. Nation-states, he asserts, may choose to
disentangle themselves from the web of international
interactions in which they are participating. Moreover, they
are still the primary regulatory force of economic activity. In
addition, Woods put forward that strong states might use the
3 Keohane, Robert and Nye, Joseph. Power and Interdependence. New York, N.Y.
Longman, 2001
.
Ministerio da Fazenda. Lula Prega Nova Glohalizacao . Online, August 15,
2007. < http://www.serpro.gov.br>
18 Scholte, Jan. Globalization : A Critical Introduction. London: Palgrave,
2000 .
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process of globalization to force other states to accept their
values. In her view, globalization is not weakening the ability
of strong states to govern and to regulate their citizens'
activities. 19 However, a weak state, through the globalization
process, may feel the pressure to conform to the values of
stronger states
.
Many political scientists, including Scholte, do not
believe that the effects of globalization shape into one clear,
distinct view. 20 For example, in the case of culture,
globalization can promote both homogenization as well as
tribalism. Hollywood can promote assimilation of Western values
through its movies. Nonetheless, the dissemination of these same
values through this medium can alienate other cultures which
would lead to a complete rejection of the western culture. In
certain cases, cultural values are so incompatible that a clash
of civilizations is unavoidable. 21 Thus, their effects do not
follow one single direction clearly. Even though the number and
the intensity of cross border interactions may increase in the
future it does not mean that it will change the nature of world
politics and the society in which we live. The trend towards
' Woods, Ngaire (Ed.) . The Political Economy of Globalization. London:
Palgrave. 2000.
Scholte, Jan. Globalization: A Critical Introduction. London: Palgrave,
2000 .
1 Huntington, Samuel. "The Clash of Civilizations?" Foreign Affairs , (Summer
1993) .
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globalization can be reversed, however unlikely this may be.
Although the evidence about the growing interconnectedness is
beyond challenge, the idea about the globalization of world
politics still is inconclusive. Meanwhile, the power to decide
whether, when and how to become interdependent still rests with
the state.
Approaches to Political Economy
Since the end of World War II, the world has seen a wave of
liberalization. In its early phase, several international
organizations and treaties such as the International Monetary
Fund (IMF) , the World Bank, and the World Trade Organization
(WTO) and its predecessor the General Agreement on Tariff and
Trade (GATT) were created or ratified. These organizations were
focused on the promotion of liberal values such as free trade
and laissez-faire . Following this initial effort, many nations-
states undertook major market-oriented political and economic
reforms. Deregulation and privatization have been the major
goals of these reforms. Because of liberalization businesses
prospered; however, what were the costs of this market
liberalization to nation-states?
Vivien Schmidt argues that some nation-states are paying a
higher cost then they expected. She believes states are
becoming weaker as they lose the ability to regulate capital and
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social interests are relegated to a position of lesser
priority. 22 Though Schmidt correctly points out that business is
gaining strength vis-a-vis the state, she fails to recognize
that the states maintained the exclusive ownership over hard
power. Moreover, this situation has developed with the
knowledge and consent of the states. Nations adjust the
relationship between politics and economics accordingly to the
ever changing responsibilities. The state has the ability to
choose which model of development to follow based on its
responsibilities
.
As the state's responsibilities change, the state's
approach to the economy will change as well. States'
responsibilities change as the "relationship between public ends
and private interests" takes different shapes depending on which
of these areas is given priority. 2 Below, I will present the
most common approaches.
Liberalism as an economic theory is based in the concepts
of freedom and equality. For liberals, economics and politics
are distinct and completely separate spheres. The economy
provides for the satisfactions of private wants whereas the
state deals with public needs. Liberals assume that the market
: Schmidt, Vivien A. "The New World Order, Incorporated: The Rise of Business
and the Decline of the Nation State," Daedalus, Vol. 124, no. 2 (Spring
1995) .
J Caporaso, James A. and Levine, David P. Theories of Political Economy.
Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1992.
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is able to operate efficiently because individuals will make
rational decisions based on the free and accessible information.
If left alone, the market will grow and the whole society will
benefit. According to classical liberalism, the market has the
capacity to be self -regulated . Market actors, following the law
of supply and demand, are able to provide for all needs of
society at a given price. Furthermore, liberals differentiate
between market failure and individual failure. For them,
individuals are to blame for any problems in the smooth
operation of Smith's invisible hand. 24 Economic liberals are
adamant defenders of laissez-faire . Because the market, in
their view, is capable of self -regulation, there is no need for
government intervention.
Marxism was created as a reaction to liberalism. Marxists
would argue that the economy is inherently political. "Powerful
political forces" , argued Marx, "originate in the dynamics of
the capitalist economy." 21 Marxism states that capitalism, due
to the same characteristics that make its functioning possible,
cannot be viable in the long run. According to Marx, there are
three inevitable laws that will lead to the failure of
capitalism. First, overproduction is imminent and certain in
Jean-Baptiste Say asserts the impossibility of market failures. In his
view, the balance between demand and supply cannot be broken (Say's law)
.
3 Caporaso, James A. and Levine, David P. Theories of Political Economy.
Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1992.
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the capitalist mode (law of disproportionality) . Second,
capital accumulates in the hands of few (law of concentration)
.
Third, return on investments will decline as capital is
accumulated (falling rate of profits) . The effects of those
three laws combined with class consciousness will lead to the
uprising of the proletariat in the form of a revolution against
the capitalist mode of production. The problem with capitalism,
Marxists would argue, is that the system is irrational despite
the rationality of individuals. Moreover, Lenin viewed the
relationship among capitalist states as intrinsically
conf lictual
.
2 To avoid collapsing, strong states will exploit
weaker ones.
Neoliberals employ a utilitarian perspective to their view
of the market; they apply the concept of utility to the
framework of classical liberalism. Indeed, the core principle
of neoliberal theory is utility maximization. According to
neoliberals, rational individuals seek to maximize the
satisfaction or pleasure they receive from consuming a service
or product. They assume that individuals will choose
alternatives that generate the greatest satisfaction and
maximize welfare. Thus, scarcity is based on both the
preferences of individuals and the natural availability of
D Gilpin, Robert. The Political Economy of International Relations
.
Princeton, NJ : Princeton University Press, 1987.
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resources. Externalities arise because individuals can benefit
from collective action. Because the market allows for all
individual to maximize their utility through trade, neoliberals
judge it to be the most efficient method for individuals to
achieve desirable outcomes. However, in certain circumstances,
maximum individual utility may only be achieved with the
interference of the state. Although the economy and the state
should be treated as completely different spheres, in cases of
market failure the state should intervene. The state can
correct market deficiencies by equating private and social costs
(fines and subsidies), creating and enforcing government
regulation, and providing a forum for litigation. 2 Within the
neoliberal framework, both state and private individuals pursue
utility maximization.
The Keynesian approach questions the liberal and neoliberal
assumption that markets, when left alone, will make the most of
society's productive potential. As Keynes notes, adequate
purchasing power may not be achieved if allocation of resources
is left entirely to the price mechanism. In his view, the
market mechanism is imperfect because of the instability in the
production of goods. Like Marx, Keynes argued that the
unregulated production goes through a series of "explosions,
Caporaso, James A. and Levine, David P. Theories of Political Economy.
Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1992.
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cataclysms, and crises" that are inherent to the capitalist
system. 28 "The market without any supervision may remain in a
chronic condition of subnormal activity for a considerable
period of time without any marked tendency towards either
recovery or towards complete collapse."" However, differently
than Marx, Keynes never predicted the violent collapse of
capitalism. If Keynes' view of the economy is correct, the
state is expected to become a proactive actor within the market.
Without state participation optimal utilization of resources may
never take place in the market system.
In the nationalist approach, "economic activities are
subordinate to the goal of state building and the interests of
the state." 3 For nationalists, politics is above economics.
Nationalists' goals include political autonomy and economic
self-sufficiency. Industrialization is extremely important to
nationalists, as they perceive it to be the most important way
to achieve national goals. Moreover, Nationalists view the
international scenario as being intrinsically anarchic and
confrontational. Thus, economic interdependence can lead to
political vulnerability. It can also be used as a means of
8 Tucker, R. The Marx-Engels Reader. New York, NY: W. W. Norton, 1978.
5 Keynes, J. General Theory of Employment , Interests and Money. New York, NY
Harcourt , Brace and World, 1936.
Gilpin, Robert. The Political Economy of International Relations
.
Princeton, NJ : Princeton University Press, 1987.
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domination. Nationalists are not only concerned with the
absolute gains from international cooperation; they pay close
attention to relative gains as such cooperation can
disproportionably benefit other nations. Because of this
emphasis in relative gains, nationalist states often behave as
mercantilist nations; in their view, pursuing wealth is also
pursuing power.
The power to choose which approach to follow rests
exclusively with the state. Furthermore, the chosen ideology
will shape the relationship between public and private spheres.
For example, by choosing the Keynesian approach the state will
see itself as another actor of the market, albeit one of the
biggest. State participation is expected in order for the
market to achieve maximum productivity. Although the state
participates in the economy the individuals are free to pursuit
their own goal. Conversely, if the state chooses to follow a
nationalist approach, national security becomes the most
important objective. Since the functioning of the economy can
affect national security, nationalist societies will monitor
economic fluctuations closely. The behavior of individuals and
corporations must to conform to the goals of national security.
In this approach, the private sphere is subservient to the
national interest
.
With the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1989, political
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', iScientist Francis Fukuyama declared the "end of history" . In
Fukuyama's view the fall of the USSR prove the failure of all
other economic ideologies; thus, no economic ideology existed to
compete with liberalism. However, as we have seen above history
is still undefined. Notwithstanding the overwhelming decline of
Marxists economic ideologies, still there is an array of
competing philosophies from which states can choose.
Short History of the Brazilian Economy:
From 1929 to the End of the Military Dictatorship
The decade of 1930s was a tumultuous period for Brazil.
Similar to most economies around the world, Brazil's economy had
been deeply affected by the Stock Market Crash of 1929. Brazil,
which had previously relied on the exportation of agricultural
commodities, especially coffee, suffered a huge blow as prices
of commodities felt to bottom and demand for its products
decrease in the international market. As a result, terms of
trade deteriorated and growing foreign debt threw Brazil into a
recession that would shape new economic and political
developments. In 1937, Getulio Vargas, a populist and
authoritarian figure, came to power in Brazil. Through a coup
d'etat, he established the Estado Novo regime (1937-1945).
1 Fukuyama, Francis. "The End of History?" The National Interest , (Summer
1989) .
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Vargas centralized power that previously rested with the states
and gradually adopted a nationalist approach as a model to
economic development. Great progress toward industrialization
was achieved during this period due to government's investment
into the private sector and the external crisis. Brazil was
forced to start producing consumer goods within its borders
because it had lost its revenues from foreign trade and it was
no longer able make the payments for foreign products. The
initial attempts to implement Import Substitution
Industrialization (ISI), which focused on the substitution of
imported products by goods produced domestically, were made
during this period. From this point forward, ISI would become
the most widely used economic policy for at least half a
century
.
As the Allies fought the Axis powers, international trade
especially of raw materials increased in the years of World War
II. Brazilian exports increased by 572.7% between the period of
1931 and 1951, and foreign exchange reserves accumulated. 3.
However, improvements in the economy were short-lived;
overvalued exchange rates and high inflation soon led to a
balance of payments deficit. In 1951, President Vargas, now
elected through the popular vote, chose to implement tight
: Instituto Brasileiro de Geografla e Estatistica. Estatistica do Seculo XX.
Online, September 20, 2006. <www.ibge.gov.br>
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foreign exchange controls and import quotas for certain
categories of products. Nevertheless, his policies failed and
Brazil experienced a steep fall in its exports - a 36.1% decline
from 1954 to 1959. 33
By 1964, when the military took over, Brazil had been
transformed from an agricultural economy to an industrialized
society. Nonetheless, the achievements of industrialization
were not always clear as it presented mixed results. At
specific periods, Brazil's economy experienced formidable growth
rates, but it lagged the drive to sustain a continued upward
trend. The military seized control of the political
establishment by taking advantage of the volatile circumstances
in which the economy was embroiled. 34
Economically, the accomplishments of the military were
disappointing. During the late 1960s and early 1970s, the world
experienced a credit boom and Brazil promptly started to borrow
money to continue its industrialization push. The influx of
capital along with the enactment of non-tariff barriers, erected
to shelter domestic industries from international competition,
achieved successful results. In this short-lived period,
Brazilian GDP grew so fast that some analysts named this time
1 Instituto Brasileiro de Geografla e Estatlstica. Estatistica do Seculo XX.
Online, September 20, 2006. <www.ibge.gov.br>
1 Suzigan, W. and Szmrecsanyi, T. (Eds). Historia Economica do Brasil
Contemporaneo . Sao Paulo, Brazil: Editora da Universidade de Sao Paulo, 2002
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span "the miracle years". In fact, from 1967 to 1972 the
economy grew at a staggering rate of 11.4 % per year.'
Nevertheless, this period of unprecedented growth would not last
long. The oil crisis in 1973 and 1979 not only halted the
growth of the economy but led to a major crisis. Due to rising
interest rates and increasing oil bills, the Brazilian
government lost the capability to service its debt. Moreover,
international creditors were unwilling to continue loans since
several developing countries declared insolvency. Once again,
Brazil readopted the ISI policy with hopes to resume growth.
However, this time instead of promoting growth, ISI created
inefficient sectors in the economy as non-tariff barriers
prevented competition. Furthermore, the tightening of
international credit coupled with the low rate of domestic
savings, pushed direct investment in the economy to
exceptionally low levels. In addition, poorly devised monetary
policy, which maintained the value of the national currency
artificially high, led to a rapid escalation of inflation. In
1989, inflation reached a record of more than 1500%. 3 As
stagflation took over the economy, the 1980' s were dubbed "the
' Instituto Brasileiro de Geografla e Estatlstica. Estatistica do Seculo XX.
Online, September 20, 2006. <www.ibge.gov.br>.
: Brum, Argemiro J. Desenvolvimento Economico Brasileiro . Petropolis, Brazil
Editora Vozes, 1997.




As the military government lost its grip over the economy,
pressures to a return to democracy grew. Suzigan and
Szmrecsanyi state that the incompetence of the military regime
to manage the Brazilian economy was the main reason behind the
end of the military dictatorship and the return to democracy. 3
However, despite the hopes of many, the return to civilian rule
alone would not be enough to solve the problems of the Brazilian
economy. Indeed, a long period of trial and error would take
place before the Brazilian economy would show any signs of
improvement
.
Initial Attempts to Reform: 1985 to 1993
Before the economy could finally be stabilized, Brazil
embarked on a series of heterodox stabilization plans. Those
plans were usually based on the creation of new currencies as
well as on the application of selective price and wage controls.
Despite their initial successes, all plans put into operation
before 1993 failed in their objective of controlling inflation
in the long run. Moreover, each failed plan laid the
Stagflation is the condition when the economy faces simultaneously a
period of stagnant growth or even recession and rapid inflation.
n Suzigan, W. and Szmrecsanyi, T. (Eds). Historia Economics do Brasil
Contemporaneo . Sao Paulo, Brazil: Editora da Universidade de Sao Paulo, 2002
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foundations of its successor. For example, the Bresser plan
of 1987, the Rice and Beans Plan of 1988, and the Summer Plan of
1989, all made use of selective price and wages freezes that
were first introduced by the Cruzado plan in 1986.
Jose Sarney, the first civilian to assume the office of the
President in more than thirty years, started to apply non-
orthodox macroeconomic policies aimed at stabilizing the economy
in conjunction with ISI program. In 1986, Sarney launched the
Cruzado Plan. This plan created a new currency - the cruzado -
and selectively froze prices and wages. In the first months
after the implementation of the Cruzado Plan, the inflation rate
felt and economic activity rose. Regrettably, this increased
growth alongside price freezes placed additional strain on the
government's economic policy. With a growing demand and
increasing pressure on prices, the government was forced to
defreeze prices. This in turn, led to new inflationary hikes
and a fall in real income. Without its major instrument to
check inflation, the Cruzado Plan collapsed so quickly that it
could not even celebrate its first anniversary. By the
conclusion of President Sarney' s term and after several failing
economic plans, Brazil abandoned its inward- looking policies,
including ISI, and began to pursue more open and liberal
9 Ammann, Edmund. Economic Policy and Performance in Brazil Since 1985 in
Kinzo, Maria D'Alva, and Dunkerley, James (Eds), Brazil Since 1985: Politics,
Economy and Society. London, UK: Institute of Latin American Studies,
University of London, 2003.
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strategies to economic development. 41
The election of Fernando Collor as President in 1989 marked
the beginning of a completely different approach to the
administration of the economy. From 1990 to 1992, President
Collor pursued an ambitious reform plan that focused on trade
liberalization, privatization, and market deregulation. Collor
argued that protectionism led to inefficient industries as well
as lack of innovation. To illustrate his point, when asked in
an interview about the competitiveness of Brazilian automobile
industries Collor stated that when compared to foreign vehicles,
Brazilian cars were similar to horse carriages. 41 To force an
increase in efficiency of Brazilian industries, a four-year
program was devised; this program would reduce tariff levels and
eliminate the majority of non-tariff barriers began. The Collor
administration also initiated a major drive to privatize
government enterprises. By the time of Collor' s impeachment,
most of the state-owned corporations in the steel and
petrochemical sectors went private. Moreover, Collor developed
the National State Divestment Program (Programa National de
Divestimento) which served as a platform for future
privatization in other sectors. Collor also commenced a market
40 Bulmer- Thomas, Victor (Ed). Regional Integration in Latin America and the
Caribbean: The Political Economy of Open regionalism. London, UK: Institute
of Latin American Studies, 2001.
4 . Interview with Fernando Collor de Mello. Revista Veja , (January 1989]
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deregulation program in order to enhance productivity in
domestic markets. Despite progress in promoting liberal
measures, the Brazilian economy continued to perform below par
due to political upheaval, including weak control over
macroeconomic policy and Collor's removal from office.
With Collor's impeachment at the end of 1992, Vice-
President Itamar Franco assumed the Presidency. 42 Although
Franco was perceived to prefer a more eccentric approach to
economic matters, he chose as his Finance Minister renowned
sociologist Fernando Henrique Cardoso. With Franco's carte
blanche, Cardoso assembled a team of distinguished economic
experts focusing around Pedro Malan and Gustavo Franco, who
would later become Finance Minister and Governor of the Central
Bank respectively. Nevertheless, it was not until 1994 that
inflation would fall bellow two digits and the economy would
start growing again.
The Real Plan
By the end of 1993, Cardoso allied with his economic
advisors devised what became known as the Real Plan. It
entailed four major elements. First, a new currency, the real,
was introduced. The real was pegged to dollar in order to make
President Collor was removed from his position, based on allegations of
corruption. Along with associates, Collor was accused of diverting public
resources to private accounts.
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imports cheaper and facilitate foreign competition. This
increase in competition moderated inflationary pressures.
Second, government practiced a tight control of monetary policy.
By controlling the money supply, the government could ensure the
conversion of the real to the dollar. In addition, it could
control supply-side inflationary pressures caused by monetary
surplus in the economy. Third, Congress approved spending cuts
of R$8.2 billion (equivalent to US$7.5 billion at the time) and
additional federal tax increases in the order of 5 to 7%.
Higher revenue and lower spending would assist the government in
balancing its accounts as well as paying its debt. Fourth, the
indexation system was abolished. 43 Because wages and prices
could no longer be indexed to new levels of inflation,
inflationary momentum was broken. 44
With the implementation of these policies, GDP increased
from 4.9% in 1993 to 5.9% in 1994. At the same time, inflation
between 1994 and 1995 came down from 916.46% to 22.41%. 45
Different from its predecessor, the Real Plan proved to be
i Amann, Edmund and Bauer, Werner. "The Illusion of Stability: The Brazilian
Economy under Cardoso," World Development , Vol. 28, no. 10.
1 Due to years of persistent hyperinflation, Brazilian society became
accustomed to price and wage hikes. In previous stabilization plans, it was
noticed that prices continued to move up even though there was no economic
reason for it to behave like this. Some academics, as well as Cardoso, argued
that in those circumstances, inflation was prevalent only because society
continued to expect inflation to push prices up. They called this phenomenon
inflationary inertia.
4E Gambiagi, Fabio et al . A Economia Brasileira nos Anos 90. Brasilia,
Brazil: Banco Nacional de Desenvolvimento Economico e Social, 1999.
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capable of lowering inflation and simultaneously fostering
growth. Moreover, with the election of Cardoso to the office of
the Presidency at the end of 1994, the government sought to
consolidate the achievements of the Real Plan and insulate
Brazil from external crisis. To accomplish this goal,
government authorities turned its attention to a policy of
fiscal adjustment; however, fiscal deficits continued until
1998. Nonetheless, despite the effort to protect the plan and
consolidate achievements, the foundation of the Real Plan soon
would be under attack.
Between 1994 and 1998, Brazil passed through three major
international financial crises. The crisis in Mexico came first
and fears of other Latin American nations collapsing took over
the world. In 1997, contagion hit Asia, and by 1998, Russia had
spun out of control. With each of these crises, Brazil felt
increased difficulty to keep the real pegged to the dollar. In
order to maintain the conversion between the real and the
dollar, the Central Bank was obligated to start selling it
foreign reserves. This type of monetary control was not
sustainable and authorities allowed the real to float within a
predetermined range. If the exchange rate drifted away from its
target band the Central Bank would intervene. Although this
policy was effective in maintaining the price of real to an
average US$0.92 during 1995, the strong real prevented the
Changing Nature 3 5
growth of exports and at the same time promoted a surge in
imports. 46 As a result of a strong currency and skyrocketing
demand for imported goods, Brazilian current accounts started to
deteriorate quickly. With evaporating foreign reserves and a
persistent fiscal deficit, the situation became critical by
1998 . In this situation, Brazilian officials saw themselves
compelled to approach the IMF for assistance. The IMF agreed to
loan Brazil US$41.5 billion in order for the government to
maintain liquidity. In accordance with IMF loan conditions, the
Brazilian government established a primary surplus target of
4.25% of GDP for the non- financial public sector. 47
Nevertheless, investors incredulous of the sustainability of the
real-dollar parity, continued to move capital away from the
country. In 1999, the Central Bank reluctantly permitted the
real to float freely against the dollar. By doing so,
authorities eliminated a central element, if not the most
important aspect, of the Real Plan. The consequences of a
weaker currency; however, were more positive than they expected.
The last two years of President Cardoso' s first tenure
were quite slow regarding the advancement of reforms. Instead
of paying close attention to his reform agenda, Cardoso spent
46 Gambiagi, Fabio et al . A Economia Brasileira nos Anos 90. Brasilia,
Brazil: Banco Nacional de Desenvolvimento Economico e Social, 1999.
International Monetary Fund. Brazil: Selected Issues and Statistical
Appendix. Online, October 11, 2006. <www.imf.org>
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most of his efforts cajoling the Congress to amend the
Constitution in order to allow him to run for reelection.
Nevertheless, in his second term in office, Cardoso led a major
push to reform public finances. Fiscal responsibility and
social security were in his sight; reforming these areas would
prove to be extremely difficult however. The Constitution of
1988, with its all encompassing and lengthy provisions, dictates
the actions that the Federal Government must follow, without
even a minor deviation, in several areas.
The Law of Fiscal Responsibility which was approved in 2000
was aimed at revising the fiscal responsibilities of the Federal
Government to States and Municipalities. It ends the obligation
of the Federal Government to transfer resources to state or
municipal governments and sets stringent limits on the spending
of federal, state, and municipal governments. Likewise, the
Federal Government is prohibited from paying debts accumulated
by the lower levels of government. 48 As complementary law, the
Fiscal Crimes Act of 2000 establishes criminal prosecution and
imprisonment for public official who do not comply with the
Fiscal Responsibility Law. Those two pieces of legislation were
responsible for a major shift in the fiscal behavior of public
officials in state and municipal levels. Presently, state
43 Tesouro Nacional . Lei de Responsabilidade Fiscal. Online, November 17,
2006. <www.tesouro.fazenda.gov.br>
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governments and municipalities are responsible for funding their
own projects and are accountable for their fiscal decisions.
The social security system also entered the reform agenda
as politicians tried to balance the budget. Since its inception
in Brazil during the first Vargas administration, the social
security system has been beleaguered with deficits. At first,
the system was created to attain political objectives and the
regulations administered by National Institute of Social
Security (Instituto National de Seguranca Social) reflect these
concerns. Social security rules were not clear and
disproportionally benefited public sector bureaucrats, which
were the major supporters, along with the poor, of populist
President Vargas. The Social Security reforms of 1998 and 1999
were proposed with the intention of limiting the scale of social
security spending and improving the flows of contributions.
These reforms sought to implement a minimum retirement age and a
link between contributions and benefits. These new rules
targeted public sector workers since they represent the bulk of
beneficiaries but proportionally to benefits are the ones who
contribute the least. Despite these reforms, in the year 2000
the INSS registered a deficit of more than R$10 billion
(equivalent to US$5.6 billion at that time) . 49 Moreover, it is
3 Banco Central do Brasil. Boletim Mensal (Fevereiro 2001). Online, November
17, 2006. <www.bcb.gov.br>
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also important to point out that the Brazilian government had
already allocated to social security 31.4% of the 2000 budget or
R$62.96 billion. 50
The Real Plan and the Cardoso administration usually
receive positive evaluations from analysts. These evaluations
reflect the simple fact that the Real Plan achieved what several
other economic packages could not do - it finally brought
inflation under control. Moreover, the Cardoso government also
sought to liberalize the economy by advocating and implementing
fiscal austerity, market deregulation, privatization, and trade
liberalization. Despite the lack of implementation of many
proposed reforms during Cardoso's tenure, his administration is
widely recognized as achieving great success in the area of
macroeconomic stabilization. Nonetheless, in other areas,
reviews are not so encouraging. Inequality in Brazil remains
high. In spite of real per capita GDP resuming to grow due to
the low inflation environment and the income of millions of
Brazilian citizens rose above poverty level, social mobility
continues to be extremely low. In reality, changes in any
measure of inequality are insignificant when comparing periods
before and after the Real Plan. According to World Bank
3 Ministerio do Planejamento, Orcamento e Gestae Orcamento 2000. Online,
July 03, 2007. <www.planejamento.gov.br>
1 Weyland, Kurt. The Politics of Market Reform in Fragile Democracies
:
Argentina, Brazil, Peru, and Venezuela. Princeton, NJ : Princeton University
Press, 2002.
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reports, the Brazilian Gini Coefficient measured 0.60, one of
the highest in the world. 5 '
Challenges of Further Reform
The Brazilian Constitution is another roadblock that
prevents further reforms. The sixth Federal Constitution of
Brazil was enacted in 1988. After many years under Military
rule the people and the political elites were demanding a
credible institution of government. The Constitution was
believed to be the instrument that would give balance to the
government. It established Brazil as a Republic of 26 states
and one Federal District. It expanded the powers of the
National Congress, the legislative branch of Brazil, to balance
the powers of the president. It gave more responsibility to the
states regarding financial issues and autonomy over internal
affairs. It ensured universal suffrage and equality for all
citizens
.
The new Constitution was an attempt to purge the ghosts of
the Military dictatorship. The first chapter of the
Constitution deals with the individual rights and liberties.
However, freedom from persecution is not the only concern
expressed in the Constitution. Social Integration and
The Gini Coefficient is a widely utilized measure of income inequality. A
Gini Coefficient of zero reflects a highly egalitarian society in which all
individuals receive equal incomes. A value of one represents a country in
which one individual receive all the income while others have nothing.
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eradication of poverty have their own articles.
In general, the Brazilian Constitution is a complex and
long document. For example, the constitution separates the
Government in three powers: Executive, Legislative, and
Judiciary. In the chapter about the Legislative power, instead
of briefly describing a bicameral National Congress with an
upper, the Senado Federal, and a lower chamber, Camara dos
Deputados, the Constitution goes further and defines the rules
for legislative commissions, reunions and so on. Issues such as
those could be solved by the internal rules of each chamber;
however, they all have been defined in the Constitution. The
lack of flexibility leads to a problem in Brazil; the need to
amend constantly the Constitution, but doing so is not always an
easy task. Moreover, the Federal Constitution stipulates the
proportion of the budget that is needed in the area of
education, health, security, social security, retirement
payments, payroll and other expenses. This sometimes generates
problems for the government because it is limited in its ability
to re-design the budget.
Political culture also prevents reforms from taking place
in Brazil. The political culture of Brazil is tied to the events
experienced by its people throughout its history. For example,
a major trend that can be identified in Brazilian politics and
that had been inherited from the economic relationships among
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the colonialists and the colonized, master and slaves, landlords
and tenants, industrialists and workers was Patrimonialismo.
Patrimonialismo was influenced by the social current of
Paternalismo . In different times and places, Patrimonialismo
took different shapes. In the Northeast of Brazil, it became
the Coronelismo, in the interior, among the rural population, it
took the name of Clientelismo and in the large and industrial
cities, especially among the working class, it was called
Populismo.
The origin of those currents has to do with the Portuguese
colonization of Brazil, where the contradictions of Brazil first
appeared. In summary, Portugal had an immense and rich Empire;
however, it lacked the human resources necessary to manage its
colonies. At the same time that the Colonial government was
strong, it did not have enough people to control effectively its
possessions. Therefore, blending the state and the civil
society became necessary in order for the state to achieve its
objectives. The government would distribute its properties in
exchange for cooperation and loyalty. This is the key feature
of Patrimonialismo and of many problems of modern Brazil. This
tradition led people to perceive the use of the state's machine
in order to secure personal gains as a common and almost
acceptable event. Although such actions are considered serious
crimes in Brazil, corruption is rampant. It is ingrained in all
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levels of government, from public servants at local utility
companies to elected officials in Congress and judges and
prosecutors in the judiciary system.
What Accounts for the Successes of the Real Plan?
Why did the Real Plan succeed where others failed? Why did
the Real Plan accomplish so much in the area of economic
stabilization, while falling short of benefiting the whole
society equally? Some political scientists argue that for
economic reforms to be successful the presence of certain
conditions is necessary. According to John Williamson and
Stephan Haggard, the conditions conducive to successful reforms
go beyond a well -elaborated and comprehensive program, but they
also include a crisis environment, external pressure and help,
democracy, a honeymoon period, a visionary leader, and the use
of the media. 53
Hyperinflation and sluggish economic growth were
responsible for the crisis environment in Brazil during the last
decades of the twentieth century. The persistence of this
crisis convinced society and its elites that not reforming had a
much higher cost than adapting to a more liberalized
environment. Depending on the magnitude of the crisis, society
' Williamson, John and Haggard, Stephan. The Political Conditions of Policy
Reform in Williamson, John (Ed) . The Political Economy of Policy Reform.
Washington, DC: Institute for International Economics, 1993.
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may stop seeing economic reforms as a zero- sum game where some
segments of the public may gain while others will lose. Instead
of quarreling about the relative benefits and losses of reforms,
Brazilians believed that the economic stabilization policy would
generally improve social conditions. However, soon after the
economy was stabilized and the economic crisis became something
of the past, deep structural reforms faced roadblocks in winning
approval
.
The series of financial crises during the 1990s created
enough pressure for Brazil to try to insulate its economy and
pursue fiscal austerity measures. However, it was not able to
do so by itself and it had to seek assistance from the IMF. The
IMF agreed to provide enough resources for Brazil to solve its
liquidity problem, but it also established certain economic
targets to be met. Brazil also faced another challenge and
therefore sought international assistance to solve it. Due to
low rates of domestic savings, Brazil became dependent on direct
foreign investment to continue its growth. To attract the
attention of foreign investors, Brazilian authorities initiate a
series of programs to make the business environment more
transparent, eliminate red tape, and allow for easy flows of
capital
.
Although the authoritarian regime in Brazil could devise
and implement new policies at will, the majority of its policies
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failed because the government had placed purely political
objectives above economic matters. Moreover, the military lost
its credibility to implement reforms since instead of policies
being aimed at improving the economic conditions of individuals,
economic reforms sought to strengthen the state. However, in a
democracy this is more difficult to do since information flows
more freely. Democracy brings credibility and legitimacy for
the actions of the government. It also allows public
participation in the process of reform. Furthermore,
transparency and accountability make the need for reform much
clearer to society. Foreign investors also feel more confident
in investing in countries that are more transparent and business
practices are less complex. Regardless of these benefits, some
pundits deemed the democratic process as being too indecisive to
be able to enact reforms efficiently. The process of
implementing economic reforms under a democratic regime may look
like a bumpy road where politician have to take several detours
and negotiate with different groups safe passage. However, once
this process is concluded reforms are by and large more easily
accepted.
The Cardoso government benefited from a greater freedom of
political maneuver than its predecessors. Citizens were
marveled with the achievements of Fernando Henrique Cardoso
during his time as Finance Minister, but they were also full of
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hope vis-a-vis what his newly elected government may achieve.
"Incoming democratic governments," Williamson and Haggard wrote,
"typically enjoy a period when they can trade short-term
economic losses against various political gains". 54 This phase
in which society seems more flexible to support the policies of
newly elected governments was named the honeymoon period.
Moreover, government officials can blame the legacy of the past
administration for any problematic decisions they may take. The
Cardoso administration utilized this honeymoon to its advantage;
it pressed Congress to approve measures that would solidify the
initial achievements of the Real Plan and protect the economy
from external shocks
.
President Cardoso brought to power his strong academic
credentials and assembled a team of economic experts that shared
his view of the future of the Brazilian economy. During the
whole process of implementation, Cardoso used the media,
especially television networks, to broadcast and explain to the
population the objectives of the Real Plan, the functioning of
the economic package, and possible consequences. Different from
Collor, Cardoso never tried to surprise the Brazilian society
with drastic and sometimes illegal measures such as the freezing
of bank accounts in an attempt to take the currency, then the
54 Williamson, John and Haggard, Stephan. The Political Conditions of Policy
Reform in Williamson, John (Ed) . The Political Economy of Policy Reform.
Washington, DC: Institute for International Economics, 1993.
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cruzado novo, out of circulation.
Luiz Carlos Bresser Pereira, Finance Minister during
Sarney's tenure, stated that in addition to the conditions put
forward by Williamson and Haggard, the efficiency of economic
policies and political support that they elicit from the public
and the political elites are necessary to successful
implementation of economic reforms. 5 ' Furthermore, Bresser
Pereira defines efficiency of reforms as having a low
transitional cost and being politically feasible. The cost that
society will pay to employ reforms has to be smaller than what
it will gain.
Conclusions
Will the Brazilian state as well as other nations collapse
because of the expansion of globalization? The answer is simple
- NO. Nation-states will maintain power in the future to come;
they will remain the main actors in the international scenario.
States have the power to determine whether, how and when to
engage in interdependent relations. Although trade and
communication across borders is growing, globalization has not
gone as far as to force states to surrender their sovereignty to
supranational governments. Domestically, states can shape the
3 Bresser Pereira, Luiz Carlos. Brazil, in Williamson, John (Ed), The
Political Economy of Policy Reform. Washington, DC: Institute for
International Economics, 1993.
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relationship between politics and economics. They have the
ability to choose which approach to the economy society should
follow. Furthermore, they can make use of both hard and soft
power. States have the ability to coerce others to pursue
congruent objectives to what they perceive to be in the national
interest . They can make legitimate use of violence or reward
certain types of behavior in order to force society to follow
the governments' lead. States also have the ability to persuade
others that the governments' goals reflect what is best for the
public. Thus, because the state can make use of both types of
power, other elements of society such as corporations will never
be able to exert the same level of power as states.
Neoliberal market reforms in Brazil are a result of the
historical development of economic conditions. They took place
as a reaction to the deep crisis society was facing in the late
1980s and early 1990s. Moreover, certain circumstances during
Franco's and Cardoso's presidencies ensured the successful
implementation of these reforms.
However, the future of neoliberal reforms in Brazil is not
exactly clear. It does seem clear that Brazil will not follow
the path of Venezuela and return to a statist approach of
development. Brazilian elites are committed to a balanced
monetary and fiscal policy, trade liberalization and, to a
certain extent, market deregulation. Nevertheless, when
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considering the depth of structural reforms, the future is more
ambiguous. Attempting to reform social security in a manner
that will solve the deficit problem is politically unfeasible.
Bringing more transparency and accountability to the legislative
process seems unlikely as many politicians oppose innovations in
this area. Simplifying the tax code is also complicated as
states fear they will lose their main source of revenues - the
tax value added (Imposto sobre Circulacao de Mercadorias e
Prestacao de Servicos or I CMS) . But, a new focus is emerging.
Newly reelected President da Silva is committed to the
eradication of poverty and his programs, especially Zero Hunger,
have achieved some progress in the reduction of inequality.
As some of the conditions conducive to success no longer
exist, the pace of reforms may slow down. Crisis seems to be
long gone. The honeymoon period looks more like a divorce
hearing with the government facing constant accusations of
corruption. The media has its own agenda and pursues it
aggressively. However, Brazil is still making progress, albeit
slow. Its focus has shifted from market deregulation to income
redistribution. Perhaps in a more equal and just society, where
all can gain from the reforms, the drive to implement innovative
economic reforms will return.
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